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1955] FEDERAL SUPREMACY 407 
FEDERAL SUPREMACY AND STATE ANTI-SUBVERSIVE 
LEGISLATION* 
Alan Reeve Huntt 
STATE legislatures have been prompted by international tensions of recent years to enact new and stringent anti-subversive laws, thus 
adding to an already large body of statutes directed against various 
forms of subversion.1 Many of these statutes are open to serious objec-
tion on constitutional ·grounds. The purpose of this article is to exam-
ine those objections which are based upon the notion either that fed-
eral power in the area is exclusive or that Congress, expressly or by 
necessary inference, has pre-empted the field. 
I 
Four decisions have been selected for close scrutiny as being of par-
ticular value in illuminating the questions of federal supremacy and 
state anti-subversive legislation. The earliest of these decisions was 
rendered shortly after World War I by the Supreme Court in Gil-
bert v. Minnesota.2 A Minnesota statute made it a misdemeanor to 
teach or advocate orally or in writing that men should not enlist in the 
military forces of the United States or the State of Minnesota. Gilbert 
was convicted, fined and imprisoned for a violation of this statute. His 
conviction was affirmed by the state supreme court. He contended that 
the statute was unconstitutional on the ground that power over the 
subject matter was vested exclusively in Congress by reason of sole 
congressional powers to "provide for the common Defense and general 
Welfare of the United States," to "declare War," to "raise and support 
Armies," and to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of 
the land and naval Forces."3 States are expressly prohibited, moreover, 
from engaging in war "unless actually invaded, or in such imminent 
Danger as will not admit of delay."4 The Supreme Court, speaking 
,,. This article is a revision of a paper prepared in conjunction with the Constitutional 
Law seminar at the University of Michigan Law School in the Spring of 1954.-Ed. 
t J. D. 1954, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1 See GELLHoBN, THB STATES AND StmVERSION (1952), for a discussion of some of 
the state programs. In appendices A and B, Professor Gellhom has set out a classification 
of state laws and citations for each state, as of January 1, 1951. See also notes, 61 HARv. 
L. RBv. 1215 (1948); 66 HARv. L. RBv. 327 (1952). The latter is particularly apposite 
to the topic of this article. 
2 254 U.S. 325, 41 S.Ct. 125 (1920). 
3 These powers are delegated to Congress by art. I, §8 of the Constitution. 
4 U.S. CoNST., art. I, §10. 
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through Justice McKenna, rejected this argument. The Minnesota 
statute was held to be an appropriate aid to the federal war powers based 
upon legitimate interests of the state in ensuring the successful recruit-
ing of its citizens to serve in national military forces. Further, the stat-
ute was declared to be sustainable simply as a local police measure 
looking to prevention of breaches of the peace and having only an 
incidental effect on the concededly federal function of raising armies. 
The judgment of the Minnesota court was affirmed . 
. Chief Justice White dissented stating that Congress had occupied 
the field.5 Justice Brandeis, dissenting at greater length, argued that 
federal power over enlistments in the military forces and the conduct 
of the war was exclusive. Alternatively, he argued that even if the 
power were not exclusive, Congress had occupied the field by passage 
of the Federal Espionage Act of 1917 with the result that any and all 
state legislation in the same area must fall since " 'when the United 
States has exercised its exclusive powers ... so far as to take possession 
of the field, the States can no more supplement its requirements than 
they can annul them.' "6 Such legislation, moreover, was beyond the 
area of legitimate state concern once Congress had acted since the pri-
mary responsibility for preserving the state government rests upon the 
federal government. Finally, Justic~ Brandeis found a repugnancy 
between the Minnesota statute and congressional policy in two respects. 
First, it had long been the policy of Congress to provide that enlistments 
in United States military forces should be the result of an informed 
and free choice.7 Second, Congress in the Federal Espionage Act had 
prohibited only certain tangible obstructions to the conduct of the war 
committed with criminal intent, whereas the Minnesota act prohibited 
speech and required no such intent. Justice Brandeis concluded by 
expressing his doubts as to the constitutionality of the statute when 
further tested as against the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
In 1939 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania adopted an Alien 
Registration Act similar in effect to registration statutes enacted pre-
viously by a number of other states.8 Such laws can very clearly be 
11254 U.S. 325 at 334, 41 S.Ct. 125 (1920). 
6 Id. at 342, quoting Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 250 U.S. 
566 at 
0
569, 40 S.Ct. 36 (1919). 
7 Justice Brandeis noted that the policy of voluntary enlistments had been departed 
from only once-during the Civil War. He cited United States Army recruiting regula-
tions providing that potential recruits must be given all the facts and information before 
being signed on. Id. at 339. 
s The Pennsylvania act is cited as Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1949) tit. 35, §§1801 to 
1806. There were at the time nineteen states which had statutes or ordinances requiring 
some form of registration by aliens. This point was made by Justice Stone in his dissent 
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placed in the category of "anti-subversive legislation" since the regis-
tration provisions are generally intended as an aid to the enforcement 
of other provisions which forbid various forms of subversive activity on 
the part of aliens. Many of these statutes are in terms operative only 
in time of war or when public necessity requires. They reflect a gen-
eral fear and distrust of aliens engendered by two world wars. The 
Pennsylvania act required the annual registration, with stated excep-
tions, of aliens over eighteen years of age. Registrants received an alien 
identi:6cation card which they were required to carry at all times and 
to produce on demand of any police officer. Fine or imprisonment or 
both were provided for failure to register and also for failure to carry 
the identi:6cation card and to produce it on proper demand. Willful-
ness was not an element of the offense. At the suit of Davidowitz, an 
alien, a three-judge district court enjoined enforcement of the act on 
the ground, inter alia, that it impinged upon federal legislative powers.9 
On appeal, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, affirmed 
the judgment of the district court, and the case of Hines 11. Davido-
witz:10 has since become an important statement of doctrine with respect 
to federal power over the alien. 
The decision went upon the ground :first that by the enactment of 
the Federal Registration Act of 194011 Congress had closed the :field to 
state alien registration acts. Justice Black passed the question whether 
the registration of aliens is an exclusive federal power, holding that the 
adoption by Congress of a comprehensive scheme for regulation of 
aliens left no scope for state action of any kind in this area. In estab-
lishing the supremacy of federal power over aliens, Justice Black stressed 
at some length the paramount interests of the national government in 
securing non-discriminatory treatment for foreign nationals. Referring 
to state alien registration acts, he said: "Laws imposing such burdens 
are not mere census requirements, and even though they may be imme-
diately associated with the accomplishment of a local purpose, they 
provoke questions in the :field of international affairs." On the point 
he concluded, "Consequently the regulation of aliens is so intimately 
blended and intertwined with responsibilities of the national govern-
ment that where it acts, and the state also acts on the same subject, 
'the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State, 
in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 at 79, 61 S.Ct. 399 (1941). Some of these are 
cited in a note, 29 GEORGETOWN L.J. 755 at 767 (1941). 
9 Davidowitz v. Hines, (D.C. Pa. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 470. 
10 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399 (1941). 
11 The registration provisions, as they were in 1940, may be cited as 54 Stat. L. 673 
(1940), as amended, 66 Stat. L. 223 (1952), 8 U.S.C. (1952) §§1301 to 1306. 
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though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield 
to it.' "12 
In few of the cases resolving asserted con8.icts between state and 
federal power is the decision based upon the single ground of exclu-
sive federal power, or federal pre-emption, or actual repugnancy of 
state to federal policy. Justice Black went on to indicate his belief that 
the primary test must be whether the Pennsylvania law obstructed or 
hindered the full accomplishment of congressional purposes. As to this 
he found con8.ict between the state and federal acts. The federal act 
provided for a single registration of aliens fourteen years of age and 
over, detailed information specified by the act, :finger-printing of reg-
istrants, and secrecy of the federal :6les which could be made available 
only upon approval of the attorney-general. There was at that time no 
requirement that the alien carry a card, and failure to register was 
punishable only if shown to be willful. It was noted that bills provid-
ing for the carrying of cards had been frequently introduced without 
success in Congress.13 Without deciding whether or not registration 
of aliens was a subject admitting of only a single system of registration, 
Justice Black read the text and the legislative history of the Alien Reg-
istration Act as evidencing a congressional purpose to "protect the 
personal liberties of law-abiding aliens through one uniform national 
registration system, and to leave them free from the possibility of in-
quisitorial practices and police surveillance that might not only affect 
our international relations but might also generate the very disloyalty 
which the law has intended guarding against."14 
Justice Stone, with whom concurred Chief Justice Hughes and 
Justice McReynolds, dissented. He argued that aliens once admitted 
to the country become subject to the police powers of the state and that 
since federal power here is not exclusive the Pennsylvania law was 
clearly valid in the abse_nce of congressional legislation. Moving to meet 
the majority holding, Justice Stone said that states should be precluded 
from acting not on the basis of vague conceptions of occupancy of the 
field but only upon a showing of a "direct and positive" repugnancy 
between state and federal acts.15 No such con8.ict was found to exist, 
since compliance with the state law did not preclude or hinder com-
pliance with the act of Congress. Evidence of congressional intent to 
withdraw power over aliens from the states was considered to be totally 
12Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 at 66, 61 S.Ct. 399 (1941). 
13 For examples of congressional legislation of this type and discussion leading to 
rejection or abandonment, see 72 CoNc. RBc. 3886 (1930). 
14 312 U.S. 52 at 74, 61 S.Ct. 399 (1941). 
15 This was the expression of the test employed in the case of Sinnot v. Davenport, 
22 How. (63 U.S.) 227 (1859). 
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lacking. Rather, Congress must be presumed to have known of the 
numerous state statutes treating the identical subject matter when it 
passed the federal act.16 The fact that both state and federal laws may 
have an impact on the alien was declared to be the result simply of the 
dual sovereignty to which the alien, like the citizen, is subject. Analo-
gies were drawn to concurrent powers of state and federal governments 
in the fields of taxation and of licensing. As supporting his conclusion 
Justice Stone cited, inter alia, the case of Gilbert v. Minnesota, which 
was not mentioned in the opinion of the Court but had been urged as 
controlling in the appellants' brief. 
Early in 1952 the Michigan Trucks Act, formally entitled the 
"Michigan Communist Control Law," came into effect.17 An imme-
diate challenge to the act was issued in the form of a bill seeking an 
injunction to restrain enforcement of certain sections of the act and an 
adjudication that these sections were unconstitutional. The bill was 
brought by the Communist Party of Michigan and its secretary, Wil-
liam Albertson. A temporary restraining order was issued against en-
forcement of the act while a three-judge court was deciding on the 
merits of the petition for injunction. Two sections of the Michigan act 
were considered.18 One of these requires registration by communists 
with the State Police under oath and the furnishing of information 
with respect to the purpose of the registrant's presence within the state, 
features of identification, and other data. The same section further 
requires registration by officers of the Communist Party and disclosure 
by them of the location of offices and meeting places, names of mem-
bers, financial statements, and the like. Criminal penalties are pre-
scribed for failure to comply with these requirements. The other section 
of the act against which relief was sought provides that the name of 
any communist or Communist Party nominee shall not be printed on 
any ballot used in any primary or general election in the state or political 
subdivision thereof. 
Plaintiff's initial contention was that these sections of the act were 
invalid on the ground that the Internal Security Act of 195019 had 
16 Apparently Congress did have such knowledge. See Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary on H.R. 5138, 76th Cong., 3d sess. 
(1940). 
11 Mich. Stat. Ann. (Cum. Supp. 1953) §§28.243(II)-28.243(22). 
18 The sections challenged were §§5(a) and 7. Section 4 was also challenged :in 
Albertson's bill. It contains a defutltion of "communist front organization" for purposes of 
the act. Judge Simons dismissed the bill as to this section on the ground that no "com-
munist front organizations" were claiming or shown to be parties to the suit. Albertson 
concededly sued in his own right and on behalf of the Communist Party itself and hence 
was not in a position to seek relief against §4. 
10 64 Stat. L. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. (1952) §781 et seq. For a complete analysis of 
the act see note, 51 CoL. L. REV. 606 (1951). 
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"occupied the field" to the exclusion of any exertion of state power. 
In an opinion by Chief Circuit Judge Simons, the court rejected this 
and other of plaintiff's contentions and upheld the sections of the 
Trucks Act which had been called in question.20 Judge Simons began 
by pointing to language in Hines v. Davidowitz in which the Supreme 
Court had emphasized that no single test provides an exclusive consti-
tutional yardstick by which to reconcile competing state and federal 
claims of authority. Judge Simons read the cases cited by plaintiff as 
establishing the following principles: 
" ... (1) that where Congress enters a field of regulation, but 
does not occupy it entirely, the state is not precluded from leg-
islating therein in matters of purely state concern, (2) that exclu-
sion of the exercise of state authority is to be enforced only where 
state action conflicts, or is likely to conflict, with federal authority 
and does not apply where state legislation is complementary to 
the purpose and objectives of federal action .... "21 
Judge Simons held that the Trucks Act provisions, tested by these 
principles, were not invalidated by the Internal Security Act since 
there was no conflict between provisions of the two acts. Rather, the 
statutes were viewed as complementary to each other, one on the 
national and the other on the local level. The states were considered 
to have an abundant interest in regulating state and local elections, and 
in protecting their own governments from violent overthrow and their 
industrial plants from sabotage. As a final point in support of his hold-
ings, Judge Simons referred to the text and legislative history of the 
federal act as indicating that Congress did not propose to deal exclu-
sively with the subject matter. 
District Judge Levin dissented. He thought that the registration 
provisions of the Trucks Act invaded a field which had been pre-
empted by Congress when it enacted the registration provisions of the 
Internal Security Act. Congress, in passing the act, had evidenced 
particular concern for the welfare of the states in its declared purpose to 
"guarantee to each State a republican form of government" and had 
made a further finding to the effect that communism is a world-wide 
rather than a local problem.22 Judge Levin drew principal support from 
20 Albertson v. Millard, (D.C. Mich. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 635. 
21 Id. at 640-641. 
22 Under the section entitled "Congressional finding of necessity" [64 Stat. L. 987 
(1950), 50 U.S.C. (1952) §781] it was found by Congress that: "There exists a 
world Communist movement which, in its origins, its development, and its present prac-
tice, is a world-wide revolutionary movement. , • . ." As a result of this and a number of 
other findings, it was concluded that: ''The Communist organization in the United States ••• 
and the nature and control of the world Communist movement itself • . • make it necessary 
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one of the tests enunciated in Hines 11. Davidowitz, namely, whether 
the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." The Michigan 
act was viewed as involving state law enforcement officers in evalua-
tions of Soviet foreign policy with the attendant possibility of serious 
embarrassment to the federal government in sensitive areas of inter-
national affairs. Conceding that there was no outright conB.ict in the 
purposes of the registration provisions of state and federal acts, Judge 
Levin found further possibility of interference with congressional 
purposes in the wide differences between the two laws in the matter 
of procedure. In reasoning which was again suggestive of Justice 
Black's phrases in Hines 11. Davidowitz, he observed that the federal 
act demonstrates far greater solicitude for individual liberties in many 
respects than does the Michigan statute. He concluded, "The Con-
gressional purpose manifested in the safeguards erected in the McCar-
ran [Internal Security] Act could be thwarted and ultimately rendered 
meaningless were acts like the Michigan Act here in question put into 
operation in each or any of the forty-eight states." In the second 
portion of his opinion Judge Levin expressed the further belief that 
the Michigan act did not meet the standard of due process. 
From the decision of this district court in Albertson v. Millard23 
an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. In a per curiam opinion 
the Supreme Court remanded with directions to vacate the restraining 
order and to hold the proceedings in abeyance a reasonable time pend-
ing construction of the statute by the state courts.24 The Court invoked 
familiar doctrine to the effect that state statutes will not be passed upon 
if there exist terms and provisions of doubtful meaning as yet unclari-
fied in the state courts. An opportunity for such clarification was seen 
to exist in a bill pending in the circuit court for Wayne County which 
sought a declaratory judgment that the act was unconstitutional. 
Justice Black dissented. Justice Douglas dissented in a brief opinion 
in which he asserted that the case was ripe for decision on the two 
points presented, namely, whether Michigan could require the Com-
munist Party of Michigan and its secretary to register, and whether 
Michigan could forbid the names of communists or Communist 
Party nominees from appearing on the ballot in state and local elec-
that Congress, in order to provide for the common defense, to preserve the sovereignty of 
the United States as an independent nation, and to guarantee to each State a republican 
form of government, enact appropriate legislation. • • ." 
23 (D.C. Mich. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 635. 
24 345 U.S. 242, 73 S.Ct. 600 (1953). 
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tions. In the view of Justice Douglas no decision of a Michigan court 
could make the issues more specific. 
Acting pursuant to a provision of its penal code which defines 
sedition and makes it a felony,25 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
in 1952 convicted Steve Nelson, chairman of the Communist Party 
of Western Pennsylvania. Nelson filed motions for a new trial and in 
arrest of judgment, urging that the Smith and McCarran Acts pre-
empted the :field and precluded enforcement of the Pennsylvania 
Sedition Act. The Court of Quarter Sessions of Allegheny County 
rejected this contention on the basis that state legislation is invalid only 
when the federal government's jurisdiction over the subject matter is 
exclusive or where its power is supreme and the federal government has 
expressly or by necessary implication indicated its intention of supersed-
ing state action. The McCarran Act was read as authorizing rather 
than precluding state action, particularly in the provision that: "The 
foregoing provisions of this title shall be construed as being in addition 
to and not in modification of existing criminal statutes."26 The court 
concluded that the case was properly to be categorized as one of "con-
current jurisdiction" resulting from the fact of dual sovereignty, citing 
United States v. Lanza21 and Westfall v. United States,28 which held 
that the same acts might be criminal under both state and federal law. 
On appeal by the defendant to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, the 
conviction was affirmed per curiam on the opinion by Judge Mont-
gomery of the Court of Quarter Sessions.29 
On review by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, the 
judgment of the superior court was reversed.30 Judge Jones, for the 
court, held that the Smith Act precluded Pennsylvania from prosecuting 
members of the Communist Party under its own sedition law. He 
rested his decision on two principal grounds. First, the case was con-
sidered to be one of federal pre-emption on the basis that where both 
state and federal government have legislated in a field of paramount 
importance to the latter, the federal legislation must be taken to super-
sede that of the state. Judge Jones cited Hines v. Davidowitz for this 
25Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1945) tit. 18, §4207. 
26 64 Stat. L. 1003 (1950), 50 U.S.C. (1952) §796. 
27260 U.S. 377, 43 S.Ct. 141 (1922). This is perhaps the leading case on con-
current jurisdiction of dual sovereignties. It is customarily distinguished in decisions reject-
ing the notion of concurrent jurisdiction on the ground that it involved the 18th Amend-
ment to the Constitution which expressly authorized concurrent jurisdiction in the enforce-
ment of Prohibition. 
2s274 U.S. 256, 47 S.Ct. 629 (1927). 
29 Commonwealth v. Nelson, 172 Pa. Super. 125, 92 A. (2d) 431 (1952). 
so Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 104 A. (2d) 133 (1954), rehearing den. 
April 27, 1954. 
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proposition and, in establishing the character of the federal interest as 
paramount, declared that no federal interest could be more dominant 
than the maintenance of the security of the federal government itself. 
The cases cited in the superior court opinion to support the principle 
of "concurrent jurisdiction" were distinguished on the basis that there 
the state was properly punishing for a separate offense to its own 
dignity whereas here Pennsylvania sought to punish Nelson for sedi-
tion against the United States. Possible implications from this state-
ment to the effect that a state might not be precluded from punishing 
sedition against its own government were foreclosed by Judge Jones' 
further statement that it would be difficult to conceive of acts of sedi-
tion against a state that were not also acts of sedition against the federal 
government-"the Union of the 48 component states." Moreover, the 
duty of suppressing sedition against a state government is placed 
squarely upon the federal government by article IV, section 4 of the 
Constitution which charges the federal government to guarantee "to 
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." Con-
gress undertook this duty when, in the revised Smith Act of 1948, it 
outlawed the attempted overthrow "of the government of the United 
States or the government of any State, Territory, District or Possession 
thereof .... "31 Judge Jones concluded, "Federal pre-emption could 
hardly be more clearly indicated."32 
The second principle on which the decision rests is essentially the 
test employed in Hines v. Davidowitz and again by Judge Levin dissent-
ing in Albertson v. Millard. The test is whether or not the state act 
gives promise of hindering or obstructing congressional purposes. On 
this ground Judge Jones distinguished Gilbert v. Minnesota. Conced-
ing that a state retains the power to punish breaches of the peace, this 
does not carry with it the right to "conflict or irtterfere with, curtail or 
complement, the federal law." Such interference was found in the 
disparity of sentences prescribed for the same offense by the federal 
and Pennsylvania acts.33 Judge Jones observed, "This disparity could 
not help but confuse and hinder the attack on sedition, which calls for 
uniform action on a national basis." There is a very strong suggestion 
3118 U.S.C. (1952) §2385. This language was substituted in the 1948 revision for 
the former wording: "any government in the United States. • •• " The change does not 
appear to be one of substance. 
32 377 Pa. 58 at 70, 104 A. (2d) 133 (1954). 
33 The Smith Act provides a penalty of not more than $5000 fine or six years impris-
onment, or both, for "seditious conspiracy" [18 U.S.C. (1952) §2384] and a fine of not 
more than $10,000 or ten years imprisonment, or both, for willfully advocating the over-
throw of the government of the United States, state or political subdivision [18 U.S.C. 
(1952) §2385]. Under the Pennsylvania statute, the defendant Nelson had received a 
twenty-year sentence. 
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here of the Cooley doctrine of one uniform system of regulation which 
has long been applied in cases arising under the commerce clause,34 
but the point was not stressed. In the final paragraph of his opinion, 
Judge Jones expressed his strong disapproval of the provision of the 
Pennsylvania law permitting indictment upon information of a private 
individual. Pointing to the opportunities thus afforded for the venting 
of personal spite, he stated his view that defense of the nation by law 
should be a public and not a private undertaking, and that were the 
task accomplished by the central administration of the federal govern-
ment individual rights freely to criticize the government might better 
be maintained. In a brief concurring opinion Chief Justice Stem 
stressed the importance of prosecuting sedition, a crime against the 
nation, in the federal courts. He indicated his belief that the question 
would be finally determined by the United States Supreme Court. 
That Court has in fact recently agreed to review the Pennsylvania 
court's decision. 35 
Judge Bell entered a lengthy and vigorous dissent. He contended 
that since the power of the federal government to punish sedition is 
concededly not exclusive, federal supersedure can occur only where 
there is a direct and positive conflict between state and federal acts. 
In adopting the repugnancy test he echoed the language of Justice Stone, 
dissenting in the Hines case, and cited many of the same decisions. 
Having established his criterion, Judge Bell argued that there was no 
conflict between the two acts, and that neither the text of the federal 
statute nor the circumstances of its enactment gave the slightest indica-
tion that Congress in passing the Smith Act intended to take complete 
control of the field. In support of this conclusion, he set out a number 
of facts known to Congress at the time of the passage of the revised 
Smith Act in 1948 which he considered relevant in ascertaining con-
gressional intent with respect to pre-emption. Among these facts, he 
cited the large number of state treason and sedition laws known by 
Congress to be in effect at that time, and the further fact, also known 
to Congress, of demonstrated inability on the part of the federal govern-
ment acting alone to cope with the problem of domestic Communism. 
In the same connection, Judge Bell cited that section of Title 18 of the 
United States Code which provides: "Nothing in this title shall be 
held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several 
34 The rule enunciated in the leading case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of 
Philadelphia, 12 How. (53 U.S.) 299 (1851), will be considered at more length below. 
35 Certiorari was granted in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 75 S.Ct. 58 
(October 14, 1954). The Solicitor General was invited to file a brief presenting the view 
of the government. 
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States under the laws thereof."36 Finally, he introduced into his 
opinion a portion of a letter written by Congressman Smith, author 
of the Smith Act, to the Attorney-General of Pennsylvania in which 
the writer stated that Congress had never intended to oust the con-
current jurisdiction of states in prosecuting for subversive activities 
and that: "It would be a severe handicap to the successful stamping 
out of subversive activities if no state authority were permitted to assist 
in the elimination of this evil, or to protect its own sovereignty."37 
In his review of the decisions Judge Bell urged that the principles 
enunciated in Gilbert v. Minnesota should be controlling. He read 
the decision in Hines v. Davidowitz as resting on the premise that state 
alien registration acts would be likely to involve the nation in inter-
national controversies and might even lead to ,var. In his view these 
considerations can have no force where state treason or sedition laws 
are concerned. In conclusion, stress was laid by Judge Bell on the 
decisions upholding the concurrent jurisdiction of states and the federal 
government to punish for offenses against their respective sovereignties, 
and upon decisions in the field of labor-management relations and the 
commerce clause in which the exercise of state power has been upheld. 
II 
If the decisions which have been summarized above are to be useful 
in predicting the course of future decisions in the field, it is necessary to 
isolate and classify the ideas which appear in the opinions. It has 
already been observed that questions of federal supremacy and federal 
pre-emption are seldom decided on a single ground. It can be further 
observed that in deciding these questions courts are not very precise in 
marking off the limits of the various grounds for decision. Terms like 
"exclusive federal power" or " occupancy of the field" tend to be used 
in a variety of senses. In the above summary of the decisions a certain 
amount of systematization has of necessity been introduced. What 
follows is an attempt at even further systematization in the interests of 
determining just what considerations are likely to move a court one 
way or the other in testing state anti-subversive legislation against 
federal power and congressional purposes. The following ideas and 
assumptions are offered for further examination as underlying the 
decisions which have been reviewed. 
36 18 U.S.C. (1952) §3231. This is a general provision, of course, having reference 
to all of Title 18, and appears in the chapter dealing with the jurisdiction and venue of 
district courts. 
37 377 Pa. 58 at 90-91, 104 A. (2d) 133 (1954). 
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A. Exclusive Federal Power. It is settled by a long line of deci-
sions, chiefly concerned with regulation of commerce, that in areas 
where federal power is exclusive, states may not act within the area 
at all even though Congress has not exercised its power.38 In the area 
of anti-subversive legislation the decisions indicate little disposition to 
hold that federal power is exclusive. In part this may be the result of 
the fact that Congress has actually made wide use of its powers, and 
questions which would have been presented had such powers lain dor-
mant need not be considered. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Gilbert 
v. Minnesota, was of the opinion that federal power over recruiting 
for the armed forces was exclusive, but he went on to point to the 
Federal Espionage Act of 1917 as precluding legislation by the states. 
In cases involving the regulation of aliens as a class by the states there 
are decisions to the effect that the powers of the federal government 
are exclusive.39 Insofar as the state regulations have encroached upon 
federal powers over immigration, naturalization, or foreign commerce, 
the decisions seem eminently sound. Justice Black in the Hines case, 
however, was unwilling .to hold that the federal power to compel regis-
tration of aliens was exclusive,40 and Chief Justice Stone, in dissent, 
thought that such regulations were very clearly within the police powers 
of the state. Even the decision in Commonwealth v. Nelson, which 
recognizes the federal government's paramount interest in protecting 
national and state governments from violent overthrow, apparently 
rejects the view that this is an exclusive prerogative of the national 
government which must be denied to states even where Congress has 
not acted. 
B. Uniform National System of Regulation. Ever since the 
decision in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia41 
the Supreme Court has observed a distinction in cases arising under 
38 The rule was implied m the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 
9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 (1824) and was subsequently applied by Marshall in Brown v. 
Maryland, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 419 (1827) and m McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 
(17 U.S.) 316 (1819). 
39For example, see Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. (15 U.S.) 259 (1817) (naturaliza-
tion); Henderson v. Mayor of the City of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875) and Head 
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 5 S.Ct. 247 (1884) (power over foreign co=erce); Chy 
Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875) and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 
698, 13 S.Ct. 1016 (1893) (power to conduct foreign relations). 
40 Despite two decisions, one in a federal district court and the other in the California 
Supreme Court, which struck down state alien registration acts on the sole ground that 
such acts constituted an invasion of the powers of the federal government. See Arrowsmith 
v. Voorhies, (D.C. Mich. 1931) 55 F. (2d) 310, and Ex parte Ah Cue, 101 Cal. 197, 35 
P. 556 (1894). These statutes do appear, however, to have gone considerably beyond the 
Pennsylvania act in regulating the alien. 
41 12 How. (53 U.S.) 299 (1851). 
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the commerce clause between regulations of subject matter which 
demands a uniform national system of regulation and subject matter in 
which local diversity can be permitted. In cases falling into the former 
category, the tendency has been to hold that the states are precluded 
from acting at all; in cases of the latter class, state regulations have 
generally been upheld until Congress has manifested its intent to 
regulate in the field, or to leave it free from all regulation. This doc-
trine is potentially of great force in the area of anti-subversive legislation. 
A strong argument can be made that the problem of subversion is a 
national one which must be handled, if at all, on a national basis. Con-
siderations of international politics and of foreign policy can be 
adduced to reinforce the argument. Only the federal government, it 
may be urged, is in a position to coordinate the related problems of the 
Cold War and internal subversion. There is more than a hint of this 
type of thinking in the decisions which have been reviewed, and Judge 
Levin, dissenting in Albertson v. Millard, pointed to the congressional 
finding in the Internal Security Act that communism was a world-wide 
rather than a local problem Yet it cannot be said that the rule of the 
Cooley case has been clearly articulated as a major ground for decision 
in any of the opinions which have been examined. 
C. Congressional Action in an Area of Supreme Federal Power 
and Interest. It is in this situation that doctrines of federal pre-emption 
or occupancy of the :field are typically and properly applied. Within 
the area, application of the doctrines seems to involve a balancing pro-
cess. Where federal supremacy is very clear, and the interests of the 
national government undeniably paramount, it will require very little 
in the way of legislation by Congress to spell exclusion from the :field 
for the states. It is clear that in such cases an actual repugnance or 
conflict between state and federal statutes has not been required, nor 
have the courts demanded any clear expression of congressional intent 
to pre-empt the :field. Hines v. Davidoivitz, in fact, has since been 
interpreted as creating a presumption of congressional intent to pre-empt 
the :field in areas of supreme national importance.42 Correspondingly, 
however, where the national interest appears less paramount a court 
may insist upon more evidence of congressional intent to oust state 
power. There is, of course, no agreed upon set of rules for determining 
when the national interest is of this stature, and a point of conflict 
running through the decisions is the degree to which the national 
interest actually is supreme. A judge's view on this point is likely to 
42 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146 (1947), 
and Braden, "Umpire to the Federal System," 10 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 27 (1942). 
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have a profound influence on the way he reads the statutes for indicia 
of congressional intent. 
A second problem in cases presenting the question of whether Con-
gress has occupied the field is the matter of defining the "field." Judge 
Simons in Albertson v. Millard conceded that Congress had entered 
the field, but he did not believe that Congress had occupied it so fully 
that no scope for state action remained. In this connection it is of 
particular significance to examine the extent to which Congress has 
acted to regulate the subject matter in question. From the cases which 
have been decided under the commerce clause it may be deduced as a 
fairly safe principle that where Congress has enacted a detailed and 
comprehensive system of regulation there is greater likelihood that it 
will be held to have occupied the field than where it has touched only 
lightly on the subject.43 There is ample scope for the application of 
this idea in the area of anti-subversive legislation. In Hines v. Davido-
witz Justice Black made the point that Congress has enacted a detailed 
body of rules respecting alien registration and had further made a real 
effort to harmonize these rules with other federal statutes in the same 
general area so as to ensure uniform and comprehensive treatment of the 
subject. 
D. Repugnancy or ConfUct Between State and Federal Acts. 
One of the few principles which can be stated with assurance in the 
broad area of federal supersedure is that where there is a "direct and 
positive conllict" between a state law and a federal act the state law 
cannot stand.44 This is the so-called "repugnancy" or "conflict" test, 
and it has been applied in decisions covering a very broad range of 
subject matter. Typically the test is asserted as controlling and then 
rejected as not applicable to the facts by a judge who believes that a 
state act should be upheld. 46 Reasoning of this kind was employed by 
Judge Simons in Albertson v. Millard and by the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court in Commonwealth v. Nelson. It was also used by the dissenting 
judges in Hines v. Davidowitz and by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania in the Nelson case. Parenthetically it may be remarked that 
43 Compare Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 57 S.Ct. 842 (1937) and Savage 
v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 32 S.Ct. 715 (1912) with Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 
U.S. 148, 62 S.Ct. 491 (1942) and McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 33 S.Ct. 431 
(1913). · 
44 Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. (63 U.S.) 227 (1859), contains the classic state-
ment of the test, including the "direct and positive conffict'' clause. See also Southern Ry. 
Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424, 32 S.Ct. 140 (1912). In general see note, 60 HARv. L. REv. 
262 (1946), and particularly the cases cited at pp. 263-264. 
45 That this is true also in commerce clause decisions, see note, 60 HARv. L. REv. 
262 at 263, n. 10 (1946). 
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Chief Justice Stone, who urged the test as controlling in the Hines 
case, has on other occasions made plain his conviction that, absent 
exclusive federal power, an actual conllict is the only basis on which 
state legislation may properly be held to have been superseded. 46 The 
views of a number of other Supreme Court justices also have become 
fairly well crystallized on this question.47 
There are, however, many possible variations of the repugnancy 
test. The easiest case is one where there is such a direct conflict that 
compliance with one statute means defiance of the other.48 In such a 
case the test is essentially objective. It is a matter simply of comparing 
the texts of the state and federal acts in question. A variant which 
introduces the subjective element of congressional intent is the test 
used in the Hines case by Justice Black. As has been indicated, he 
thought that the Pennsylvania act must fall if it obstructed or hindered 
the full accomplishment of congressional purposes, and this formula-
tion was employed again by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Com-
11wnwealth 11. Nelson. The test in this form is of peculiar importance 
in decisions involving anti-subversive legislation since it furnishes a 
ground for saying that since Congress has evinced a greater regard for 
individual rights than has the state legislature ( which has commonly 
been the case), Congress must have intended that the safeguards it 
wrote into its own act should not be impaired by state legislation which 
omits comparable safeguards. This type of thinking is an important 
part of the rationale both in the Hines case and in Com111,0nwealth 11. 
Nelson. It is clear that while such a test retains an element of the 
"conllict" idea, it has moved a very great distance from the strict state-
ment of that doctrine and understandably has not met with the approval 
of judges like Chief Justice Stone or Judge Simons. · 
E. Congressional Intent to Supersede State Action. It has already 
been indicated that judges differ sharply in their views as to how 
much and what kind of evidence of congressional intent to supersede 
legislation by the states will be necesary in order to invalidate a state 
law. A presumption of such intent requiring little if any support 
46 See his dissenting opinions in Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 62 
S.Ct. 491 (1942) and Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 65 S.Ct. 1373 (1945). 
47 In the commerce field, Justice Black is of the view that where Congress has not 
acted an actual discrimination against interstate commerce is necessary. Where Congress 
has acted, Justice Black's opinion in the Hines case provides an illustration of his thinking, 
at least where he believes that the matter is of paramount concern to the national govern-
ment. In several majority and dissenting opinions Justice Frankfurter has evinced a special 
concern for the administrative realities of the asserted conflict, and has inquired whether 
competing agencies can as a practical matter reconcile their respective spheres of regulation. 
48 Judge Hutcheson in Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, (5th Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 
227 at 232. 
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from text or legislative history will be indulged in cases of direct 
conllict between state and federal laws, and by some judges in cases 
of inconsistency or disparity of provisions between the statutes if the 
national interest is thought to be of overriding importance. There can 
be no serious doubt that Congress could preclude the states from enact-
ing anti-subversive legislation and could nullify many existing state 
laws if it chose to include in its statutes an unequivocal statement of its 
intent to assert exclusive control over the :field. Moreover since Con-
gress may remove constitutional obstacles to legislation by the states in 
areas of exclusive federal concern, 49 it can certainly grant to the states 
statutory authorization to combat subversion which will be honored 
by the courts. But it is apparent from the decisions that it has done 
neither, and that judges of either persuasion can cite portions of con-
gressional acts to support their position and then either conclude that 
no conllict exists or rule on the basis of an obstruction to "congressional 
purposes." The legislative history is unsatisfactory on the point,50 and 
evidence such as that adduced by Judge Bell of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in the form of a letter from Congressman Smith would 
not be accepted as proper under usual principles of statutory interpreta-
tion.151 Much must be made of what Congress "knew" at the time, 
and again on the point it can be said both that Congress knew of the 
many state anti-subversive laws then in effect and that it recognized 
that subversion was a problem of national scope best dealt with at the 
national level. Congressional intent, it must be concluded, has been 
an unsatisfactory guide for decision, much having been presumed 
or inferred which may or may not be warranted in actual fact. 
F. Dominant Interest and Responsibility. No judge would sug-
gest that subversion is not a problem of vital concern to the federal 
government, but the decisions reflect a wide difference of opinion as 
to whether it is of such vital and overriding concern that it has ceased 
to become a legitimate subject for legislation by the states. The judges 
who believe that the national interest is primary to the exclusion of the 
states would not of course leave the states unprotected. They assert 
that it is the responsibility and duty of the federal government under 
article IV, section 4 of the Constitution to shield the state as well as 
the federal government from forcible overthrow. That section of the 
Constitution states: 
49 Such is the teaching of In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 11 S.Ct. 865 (1891), which 
was followed by cases like Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431, 56 S.Ct. 532 (1936). 
50 Legislative history will be discussed more fully below. 
151 SOTHBRLAND, STATUTBS AND STATUTORY CoNSTRucnoN, 3d ed., Horack, 504 
(1943). 
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"The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each 
of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, 
or of the Executive ( when the Legislature cannot be convened) 
against domestic Violence." 
As has been seen it is fairly common to construct an argument on the 
basis of the federal duty to guarantee to states a republican form of 
government, but the second part of the section appears to suggest an 
argument on the other side. Can it not be fairly implied from that 
language that "domestic violence" is to be the concern of $e states 
unless they have made application for the intervention of the federal 
government? Perhaps it could be shown that the intent of the framers 
cannot be said to have included subversion in the sense of incitement 
to violent overthrow. In any event, the argument has not been made. 
The opinion of Judge Jones in Commonwealth 11. Nelson provides a 
good example of the view that advocacy of the destruction of state gov-
ernments is an immediate threat to the safety and existence of the 
national government itself which is, after all, a "Union of the 48 com-
ponent states." If the decision in that case is to be confined to its facts, 
of course, it is significant that Nelson was charged only with sedition 
against the United States. At the same time assertions that there re-
mains at least a residuum of state interest which justifies state legislation 
are strongly pressed. In Gilbert v. Minnesota the majority said that 
Minnesota possessed a real interest in ensuring the success of federal 
recruiting since her citizens were being called upon to serve. Similarly, 
Justice Stone, dissenting in the Hines case, thought that Pennsylvania's 
Alien Registration Act was a wholly appropriate exercise of the police 
power which afforded to the state "a convenient method of ascertaining 
the number and whereabouts of aliens within the state, which it is 
entitled to know, and a means of their identification."52 Judge Bell 
dissenting in the Nelson case was particularly emphatic in asserting 
that states must be permitted to defend their own governments since, 
in his view, the federal government had shown its inability to cope 
with the problem. In the absence of clearer indications of congressional 
intent and policy than have so far been forthcoming, it may be ex-
pected that the question as to what extent federal interests and respon-
sibilities dominate the field will be a crucial one. 
G. Double Punishment and Dual Sovereignty. The ideas of 
double punishment and dual sovereignty are closely related in the 
52 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 at 75, 61 S.Ct. 399 (1941). 
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decisions which have been reviewed. Commonwealth v. Nelson pro-
vides the best vehicle for exploration of the relationship between these 
ideas. The notion that individuals might be punished twice for the 
same acts if the state legislation were allowed to stand was stressed in 
the majority opinion by Judge Jones. Judge Jones was also impressed 
with the fact of wide disparity in the punishments prescribed in state 
and federal laws. The point appears to have been made for two reasons. 
First, it bears upon congressiqnal intent since Congress presumably 
would not wish further and more stringent penalties to be added to 
the ones it has prescribed and, second, it indicates the capacity of state 
acts for hindering and obstructing the efforts of the federal government 
to deal with the problem. Judge Bell in his dissent read the opinion 
of the majority as resting in part upon an objection of double jeopardy 
in the constitutional sense. While it is difficult to see how the majority 
opinion could be thus construed, Judge Bell is certainly on firm ground 
when he demonstrates that the same acts constituting an offense 
against both state and federal law may be punished by either without 
valid constitutional objection.53 As the two opinions very clearly show, 
the really ultimate issue is that of dual sovereignty. The majority will-
ingly accept the decisions supporting the concurrent jurisdiction of dual 
sovereigns to punish for the same acts. The difficulty with the doctrine, 
in the view of Judge Jones, is that the acts of Nelson constituted an 
offense against the United States alone. The same division of opinion 
occurs in the other decisions as well: if these are offenses against dual 
sovereigns, each may punish; if they are offenses only against the fed-
eral government, the federal government alone should punish. For 
principles controlling the decision as to how many sovereigns are prop-
erly involved, one is then pushed back still further to considerations 
of dominant interest and responsibility. 
H. Belief as to the Unwisdom or Unconstitutionality of the State 
Act on Other Grounds. In this as in related fields where questions 
of federal pre-emption arise, it is obvious from a reading of the opinions 
that a judge's determination on the issue of pre-emption is profoundly 
influenced by his view as to the wisdom or the constitutionality on other 
grounds of the state act in question. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in 
Gilbert v. 1.\11.innesota, entertained grave doubts as to whether the Min-
nesota statute met the standards of due process. Judge Levin in his 
dissent in Albertson v. Millard had similar doubts which he expressed 
53 Judge Bell cites a number of the usual decisions including United States v. Lanza, 
260 U.S. 377, 43 S.Ct. 141 (1922); Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 47 S.Ct. 
629 (1927); and Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 41 S.Ct. 125 (1920). 
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at some length. Stem disapproval of the state laws, moreover, stands 
out all through the majority opinions in Hines v. Davidowitz and 
Commonwealth 11. Nelson. Since judges, like many other informed 
persons, differ sharply on the question of how best to meet the problem 
of internal subversion, it may be confidently predicted that considera-
tions of this kind will continue to influence the decisions of these cases. 
III 
A brief examination of the decisions and doctrine in the 6.elds of 
regulation of commerce and labor-management relations is appropriate, 
since there are many more decisions bearing on the question of federal 
supremacy and pre-emption in these 6.elds than in the area of anti-
subversive legislation. To facilitate prediction, particular attention will 
be paid to what appear to be the most recent trends in Supreme Court 
thinking. 
Substantially all of the ideas examined in the preceding section 
appear repeatedly in the decisions involving the commerce clause of the 
Constitution and congressional legislation enacted in the exercise of 
the power which that clause confers. State statutes have been invali-
dated on the ground that they invaded an area of exclusive federal 
power, whether Congress has acted or not, and also on the ground that 
the subject matter of the regulations by its very nature demanded 
uniform national legislation. 54 Tpe test of direct conflict between the 
provisions of state and federal acts has been widely conceded as appro-
priate, but less widely used in actually striking down state legislation. 
This objective, textual conflicts test has often been urged as the only 
valid criterion in the absence of exclusive federal power or facts calling 
for an application of the rule of the Cooley case. Other judges have 
believed that conflict with congressional purposes and policy is all that 
is required. Beyond this, in the area of so-called "occupation of the 
6.eld," there are decisions in accord with Hines v. Davidowitz which 
go on the ground that in certain areas of primary national concern the 
fact of congressional action in itself raises a presumption that Congress 
intended to occupy the entire 6.eld to the exclusion of the states. As 
in that case, there are strenuous dissents from such an approach. A 
second criterion which has been used in a number of decisions is the 
extent to which Congress has regulated in the area. Comprehensive 
systems of regulation which have been actually implemented are more 
54 See notes 38, 39 and 41 supra. See also Braden, "Umpire to the Federal System," 
10 UNIV. Cm. L. RBv. 27 (1942), note, 60 HA:av. L. RBv. 262 (1946). 
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likely to displace state laws than are congressional acts which only skirt 
the fringes of the subject matter.55 
While the commerce clause has largely replaced the due process 
clause as the constitutional weapon in striking down state economic 
legislation,56 and the decisions, broadly speaking, have followed the 
trend of recent years toward increasing the powers of the federal gov-
ernment at the expense of the states, the rules and doctrines with re-
spect to reconciliation of state and federal power have by no means 
crystallized in favor of the federal government. An examination of 
three comparatively recent commerce clause decisions should make this 
clear. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.51 the question was whether 
Congress by the enactment of the United States Warehouse Act had 
precluded Illinois from regulating warehouses under its Public Utilities 
and Grain Warehouse Acts. There was language in the federal act 
which unequivocally expressed the intent of Congress to eliminate dual 
regulation of warehouses subject to the act. Justice Douglas, for the 
Court, held that Congress had gone further than to make the federal 
act override state law in the event of conflict and that accordingly as to 
all matters regulated by the federal law any state regulation was wholly 
displaced. In dissent, Justice Frankfurter stated, " ... due regard for 
our federalism, in its practical operation, favors survival of the reserved 
authority of a State over matters that are the intimate concern of the 
State unless Congress has clearly swept the boards of all State authority, 
or the State's claim is in unmistakable conflict with what Congress has 
ordered."58 Justice Frankfurter, of course, read the congressional intent 
differently from the majority of the Court. In California v. Zook59 
the Supreme Court had before it a California statute which made it 
unlawful to sell or arrange for transportation over the public highways 
of the state unless the transporting carrier had a permit from the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. The Federal Motor Carrier Act con-
tained a provision which was substantially identical with respect to 
carriers in interstate commerce. Justice Murphy, for the majority, held 
that the California statute was not rendered invalid by the Federal 
Motor Carrier Act. The majority's reasoning was that the test must 
be whether the state act conflicts with national policy and whether 
Congress intended its regulations to be exclusive. On the latter point 
Justice Murphy stated that congressional intent to displace state laws 
55 Cases are cited in note 43 supra. 
56 Braden, "Umpire to the Federal System," 10 _UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 27 (1942). 
57 331 U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1146 (1947). 
5s Id. at 241. 
59 336 U.S. 725, 69 S.Ct. 841 (1949). 
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must be clearly manifested, and on the former it was held that there 
was clearly no conflict in the terms of the statutes and that mere coinci-
dence of provisions did not amount to a forbidden conflict. 60 There 
were dissents in the case by Justices Frankfurter, Burton, Douglas and 
Jackson. Justice Frankfurter thought that when Congress had pre-
scribed specific sanctions for specific offenses the states were no longer 
free to impose additional punishments. He stressed the desirability of 
avoiding double punishment even though such punishment might be 
constitutionally permissible.61 Finally, he thought that the aconflict" 
test for displacing state power as an exclusive criterion was applicable 
only when Congress had chosen to occupy a limited field. Justice Bur-
ton, with whom concurred Justices Douglas and Jackson, dissented at 
length principally on the basis that Congress intended to assert exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the subject matter. He also found conflicts be-
tween the provisions of the state and federal acts. 
In Lloyd A. Fry Roo-fing Co. v. W ood62 a majority of the Supreme 
Court applied the "conflicts" test to an Arkansas statute requiring per-
mits of "contract carriers" which were in this case engaged in interstate 
commerce. Justice Black in the majority opinion declared that no 
showing had been made of conflict between the Arkansas law and the 
Federal Motor Carrier Act or regulations of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission issued thereunder. The Arkansas act, moreover, required 
its commission to reconcile state regulation with the regulation of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. Justice Douglas dissented and was 
joined by Justices Burton and Minton and Chief Justice Vinson. He 
contended simply that Congress had pre-empted the field, citing, inter 
alia, Hines v. Davidowitz and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 
Perhaps the best that can be done by way of rationalizing the com-
merce clause decisions is to view the entire process as one of balancing 
a number of conflicting considerations which impress themselves upon 
different justices with varying force. While similarities with the deci-
sions respecting anti-subversive legislation are striking, and while Hines 
60 This reasoning is difficult to reconcile with the oft-quoted statement of Justice 
Holmes: "When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in hand coincidence is 
as ineffective as opposition, and a State law is not to be declared a help because it attempts 
to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go." Charleston & Carolina R. Co. v. Varnville 
Co., 237 U.S. 597 at 604, 35 S.Ct. 715 (1915). 
61 An early formulation of this notion is that of Justice Washington in Houston v. 
Moore, 5 Wheat. (18 U.S.) 1 at 23 (1820), where in speaking of concurrent state and 
federal legislation he observed: "If the one imposes a certain punishment, for a certain 
offence, the presumption is, that this was deemed sufficient, and, under all circumstances, 
the only proper one. If the other legislature imposes a different punishment, in kind or 
degree, I am at a loss to conceive how they can both consist harmoniously together." 
62 344 U.S. 157, 73 S.Ct. 204 (1952). 
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v. Davidowitz is as frequently cited in these cases as any commerce 
clause decision, there are at least two important points of difference. 
First, the commerce clause itself, in the absence of any congressional 
enactment, stands as a bulwark of f!;!deral power. The policy of the 
framers against "Balkanization" of the country through the erection of 
tariff barriers and other obstructions to the free How of commerce is well 
known and has been re-emphasized in numerous decisions. No con-
stitutional provision bearing upon state laws against subversion is of 
anything like this stature. Second, there are in the matter of anti-sub-
versive statutes important civil liberties considerations which do not 
intrude so forcibly into the area of regulation of commerce. The pres-
ence of these considerations may be of very real significance in deter-
mining the views of certain of the justices. 
The very considerable body of state and federal legislation pertain-
ing to the relation between labor and management has presented the 
Supreme Court with a number of complex questions involving federal 
supremacy and pre-emption. 63 These questions have in large measure 
been answered without the benefit of clearly expressed congressional 
intent respecting the areas sought to be left to the states. 64 The impor-
tant decisions can be grouped as follows: (I) decisions resting upon 
direct conflict between federal and state law or policy; (2) decisions 
based upon interference by the states with the exercise of federally-pro-
tected rights; (3) decisions involving state prohibition of conduct also 
proscribed under federal law; and ( 4) decisions concerning the regula-
tion of practices neither protected nor proscribed under federal law. 
Direct conflict between federal and state law or policy has been 
found in cases involving state representation proceedings, a state law 
prescribing strike votes, and a state law which prohibited strikes in 
public utilities.65 In Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor 
63 It is not intended here to treat comprehensively the problems of federalism and 
labor-management relations. There is much recent and highly competent commentary in 
the field. See Cox, ''Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations," 67 HARv. L. REv. 1297 
(1954); Hall, "The Taft-Hartley Act v. State Regulation," 1 J. PuB. L. 97 (1952); 
Hays, ''Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States," 102 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 
959 (1954); Ratner, "Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations,'' 3 LAB. 
L.J. 750 (1952); Rose, ''The Labor Management Relations Act and the State's Power to 
Grant Relief," 39 VA. L. REv. 765 (1953). 
64 See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767 
at 771, 67 S.Ct. 1026 (1947), and International Union, UAW-AFL v. WERB, 336 U.S. 
245 at 252, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949). In both of these cases Justice Jackson noted the failure 
of Congress to lay down guides for construction of the NLRA in the matter of permissible 
scope for state action. 
65 This attempt to segregate grounds for decision and fit them into categories of labor-
relations cases produces a pattern which is more clear-cut than the decisions warrant. 
Actually the decisions uniformly employ two or more of the possible conllict and pre-emption 
doctrines. 
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Relations Board66 foremen of the steel company had .filed petitions for 
representation with the New York State Labor Relations Board at a 
time when the National Labor Relations Board had adopted a policy 
of denying separate bargaining rights to foremen. Although this policy 
was subsequently reversed, the possibilities of conllict in the rulings 
of state and federal boards were obvious, and the Supreme Court con-
cluded that New York was without power to entertain these petitions. 
The reasoning in Bethlehem Steel was followed in LaCrosse Telephone 
Corp. 11. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board.67 That decision 
deprived the WERB of jurisdiction to determine a representation 
question involving employees who were subject to the NLRA even 
though the federal board had not acted. The constitutionality of the 
strike vote provision in the Michigan labor mediation law was tested in 
International Union, UAW-CIO v. O'Brien.68 Inspection and com-
parison of the Michigan law and the NLRA disclosed conllicting pro-
visions, the federal act permitting strikes at a different time and not 
requiring the majority authorization which Michigan had prescribed. 
There was a further inconsistency in the bargaining units which might 
be established under the respective statutes. Accordingly, the state 
legislation was held invalid under the commerce clause as conllicting 
with federal law and as an infringement on rights safeguarded by 
Congress. Disparity between the provisions of the Wisconsin Public 
Utility Anti-Strike law and the NLRA, borne out by instances of actual 
conllict in the record, likewise resulted in the invalidation of the state 
statute.69 
Decisions involving interference by the states with the exercise of 
federally-protected rights involve the application of pre-emption doc-
trines, and, more particularly, of the principle of Hines 11. Davidowitz 
that state laws cannot be permitted to stand as obstacles to the full 
accomplishment of congressional purposes. In Hill v. Florida10 a state 
statute which required the licensing of union business agents and the 
filing of union reports as prerequisites to engaging in collective bargain-
ing was held invalid as repugnant to the Wagner Act. The federal law 
was thought to establish a policy in favor of free collective bargaining 
which the states could not qualify. 
·66 330 U.S. 767, 67 S.Ct. 1026 (1947). 
67 336 U.S. 18, 69 S.Ct. 379 (1949). 
as 339 U.S. 454, 70 S.Ct. 781 (1950). 
69 Amalgamated Assn. of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees v. WEBB, 
340 U.S. 383, 71 S.Ct. 359 (1951). 
70 325 U.S. 538, 65 S.Ct. 1373 (1945). In contrast to most of the decisions under 
discussion, this case arose prior to the enactment of the Labor-Management Relations Act 
of 1947. 
430 MICHIGAN LAw R.Evmw [ Vol. 53 
The question whether state courts retain power to enjoin conduct 
also proscribed under federal law is one to which widely divergent 
answers have been given. With respect to employer unfair labor prac-
tices, the Supreme Court has taken the position that states are power-
less to grant administrative remedies in industries under NLRB juris-
diction, 71 but with respect to concerted employee activity of a type 
apparently forbidden under the NLRA the Supreme Court has only 
recently ruled. 72 In Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers13 an 
injunction was sought against picketing which at least arguably fell 
within the prohibitions both of Pennsylvania law and of the NLRA.74 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision 
granting an injunction and in reversal reasoned that the comprehen-
sive federal remedy provided under the NLRA precluded the states 
from affording additional remedies.76 The Supreme Court of the 
United States affirmed on the ground that since Congress had entrusted 
primary responsibility for enforcement of the NLRA rules to one spe-
cialized body, it must have intended that there should be centralized 
and uniform application of those rules. Justice Jackson, for the Court, 
observed, "A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are 
quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are 
different rules of substantive law."76 
The power of the states to regulate employee activity has been 
upheld by the Supreme Court where the conduct involved was con-
sidered to fall well outside the field of congressional cognizance. It was 
said in International Union v. WERB: "This conduct is governable 
by the State or it is entirely ungovemed."77 Earlier, in Allen-Bradley 
71 Plankinton Packing Co. v. WERB, 338 U.S. 953, 70 S.Ct. 491 (1950) (per curiam). 
72 Examples of the diversity of judicial thinking include State ex rel. Tidewater 
Shaver Barge Lines v. Dobson, 195 Ore. 533, 245 P. (2d) 903 (1952); Norris Grain Co. 
v. Nordaas, 232 Minn. 91, 46 N.W. (2d) 94 (1950); and Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 
(9th Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 848. 
73 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161 (1953). 
74 There could of course be no adjudication as to whether the picketing was actually 
unlawful under the NLRA since such an adjudication would have usurped the powers of 
the NLRB. It was sufficient to hold that the conduct involved was within the jurisdiction 
of the NLRB, and it was also significant that the sections of the Pennsylvania and federal 
acts bearing on such conduct were markedly similar, thus heightening the possibility of 
conllict between state and federal decisions. 
76 373 Pa. 19, 94 A. (2d) 893 (1953). A dissent in the case was filed by Judge Bell. 
His approach was similar to the position he took in Commonwealth v. Nelson. 
76 346 U.S. 485 at 490-491, 74 S.Ct. 161 (1953). The Court also rejected the argu-
ment that the NLRB was entrusted only with the enforcement of public rights and that 
Congress had laid down no rules respecting private rights. This interesting thesis, which 
must now he considered academic, is advanced in Rose, "The Labor Management Relations 
Act and the State's Power to Grant Relief," 39 VA. L. REv. 765 (1953). 
77 336 U.S. 245 at 254, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949). 
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Local v. WERB,78 the Court had approved an order of the Wisconsin 
board requiring a striking union to cease and desist from mass picket-
ing and threats of violence. The union contended that since the em-
ployer was subject to the Wagner Act the state board could have no 
jurisdiction. Justice Douglas, for a unanimous Court, found that Con-
gress had not made union conduct of the kind involved a subject of 
regulation under the federal act, and added that an intent to exclude 
states from exercising traditional police powers must be clearly shown.79 
The decision in Hines v. Davidowitz was distinguished as involving 
legislation which had an impact on the conduct of foreign relations, 
an area in which whatever state power might exist was at its lowest 
ebb. It was further observed that the federal system of alien registra-
tion in the Hines case was a "single integrated and all-embracing" one, 
v,,hile in the instant case Congress had deliberately left open an area 
for state control. Justice Douglas concluded that the situation was 
similar to the common case in which a state moves to prevent breaches 
of the peace in connection with labor disputes. This portion of the 
Court's reasoning bears a close resemblance to one of the arguments 
used in upholding the state statute in Gilbert v. Minnesota. The In-
ternational Union case developed from an order of the Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Board directing the cessation of intermittent 
work stoppages which it considered to be unlawful under Wisconsin 
labor legislation. The order of the Wisconsin board was upheld by the 
supreme court of the state, and the United States Supreme Court 
affirmed.80 It was necessary to determine initially that the work stop-
pages involved were not protected under the NLRA and, conversely, 
that the NLRB had not been authorized to forbid them. From these 
determinatio:q.s there followed the conclusion that the state police power 
had not been superseded by congressional enactment. 
In summary it may be stated that doctrines of federal supremacy 
and pre-emption have been particularly potent in the labor-management 
relations field. This is true for two reasons. First, Congress has written 
into law a comprehensive statutory scheme for the control of labor-
management relations which fall within the reach of the commerce 
1s 315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820 (1942). 
79 Id. at 749. Two of the cases cited by Justice Douglas for this proposition appear with 
especial frequency. In Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 47 S.Ct. 207 
(1926), the Supreme Court, despite the oft-quoted language, held that a Georgia statute 
regulating locomotive equipment was precluded by congressional delegation of power to the 
Interstate Co=erce Co=ission in the same area. In Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 
58 S.Ct. 87 (1937), however, the Supreme Court upheld state inspection and regulation 
of tugboats on the basis that an exercise of the state's police power should stand in the 
absence of direct and positive conflict with federal statutes. 
so 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949). 
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power. 81 Second, the agency to which enforcement of this statutory 
scheme was entrusted has in turn created a vast network of adminis-
trative rules and regulations. As a consequence the Supreme Court has 
in a majority of instances found outright or potential conflict between 
state and federal regulation, or at least an interference with express or 
implied congressional purpose. Only in a peripheral area has the Court 
felt warranted in concluding that Congress had no intent either to 
protect or to prohibit. 
IV 
Although the commerce clause and labor-management relations 
cases just discussed suggest some of the ideas which the Court may 
apply, they also demonstrate that in all fields presenting questions of 
federal supersedure, prediction is an uncertain business. 
When the Supreme Court takes up the question of whether the 
states have been deprived of the power to secure convictions under 
their own sedition laws, as it will in reviewing the decision in Common-
wealth v. Nelson,82 a number of possibilities for result and rationale 
will be offered. It is conceivable, though not probable, that one or more 
of the justices may believe the passage of laws to protect the existence 
of the United States and state governments to be an exclusive federal 
function. Such a view could proceed in part on the basis of article IV, 
section 4 of the Constitution,83 and also on the basis that the federal 
government alone possesses the peculiar competence necessary to deal 
with the threat of world-wide Communist domination in all of its 
manifestations. Of greater significance, in all likelihood, will be the 
extent to which the justices may believe the national interest in this 
area to be paramount rather than exclusive. An individual justice's 
thinking on this point may well determine his decision on the really 
critical issue of whether to apply a strict repugnancy test, or a broader 
notion of conflict with congressional policy, or finally a doctrine of 
occupation of the field. The two recent commerce clause decisions in 
California v. Zook and Fry Roofing Co. v. Wood give an indication of 
how difficult it is to predict which test may ultimately be used. Both 
of these decisions must be categorized as employing a "conflict" ap-
81 This statement might have been questionable before 1947. The Labor-Management 
Relations Act of that year, however, represents an assertion of federal power vastly more 
broad than under the earlier Wagner Act. See Ratner, "Problems of Federal-State Juris-
diction in Labor Relations," 3 LAB. L.J. 750 at 754 (1952). 
82 See note 35 supra. For comment on the Nelson case, see 67 HARv. L. REv. 1419 
(1954); 29 N.Y. Umv. L. REv. 1293 (1954); and 102 Umv. PA. L. REv. 1089 (1954). 
83 This provides that the United States shall guarantee to every state a republican 
form of government. 
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proach in judging the validity of state laws, but both were 5-4 decisions 
and the writer of the majority opinion in the Zook case, Justice Mur-
phy, is now deceased, while the writer of the decision in Wood, Justice 
Black, may well feel that state sedition legislation demands application 
of the broader test of obstruction of congressional purposes which he 
employed in Hines v. Davidowitz. This test has of course been used 
since that case and was stated recently in Garner v. Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs and Helpers.84 While it is fairly clear that the test of actual 
textual repugnancy would in the Nelson case require an approval of 
the state legislation, the test of conflict with congressional policy might 
well give a different result on several grounds. First, it is not unlikely 
that evidence could be introduced which would show that in the actual 
process of administration the federal act was being hindered and ob-
structed by the administration of overlapping state laws. Second, the 
argument used in both the Hines and Nelson cases that Congress had 
evinced larger concern for individual liberties than had the state legis-
latures might make a strong appeal to several of the justices. Finally, 
the idea of double punishment may be a basis for declaring that Con-
gress would not have intended the state act to stand. In particular, the 
distaste of Justice Frankfurter for double punishment, though it is con-
stitutionally permissible, is indicated in his dissent in the Zook case.85 
It is further possible that some members of the Court may' be will-
ing to apply an occupancy test. Should this be the criterion adopted, 
the Pennsylvania sedition law could be invalidated on the ground that 
Congress had fully occupied the field of anti-sedition legislation, and 
that consequently state laws which coincide with the federal acts are 
no more permissible than state laws which conflict with the federal 
act. 86 An approach of this nature would call for careful scrutiny by the 
Court of the legislative history and texts not only of the Smith and 
Internal Security Acts, but of the recently-passed "Communist Control 
Act of 1954"87 as well. The purposes of this recent act, and its relation-
ship to the earlier statutes, are worth examining in some detail. 
The Communist Control Act of 1954 was passed in the closing 
days of the second regular session of the Eighty-third Congress. Con-
temporary observers, even those who might have been in sympathy with 
84 346 U.S. 485 at 500, 74 S.Ct. 161 (1953), where the Court said, "For a state to 
impinge on the area of labor combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction 
of federal policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods 
which the federal Act prohibits." 
85 California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 at 739-740, 69 S.Ct. 841 (1949). 
86 See note 60 supra for Justice Holmes' formulation of the idea that coincidence may 
be as repugnant to federal law as conllict. 
87 P.L. No. 637, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (August 24, 1954). 
434 MmmGAN LAw R.Ev1Ew [ Vol. 53 
the 
0
aims of the legislation, were outspoken in criticism of the highly 
political atmosphere and absence of careful consideration which marked 
the process of its enactment into law.88 The records of the debates, it 
is believed, will not furnish even the most minimal guidance for con-
struction of the act. Statements made even by those legislators who 
spoke with this problem in mind are totally irreconcilable.89 Difficult 
as it may be, however, some notions of what Congress was seeking to 
accomplish will eventually have to be pieced together. 
As first introduced into the Senate, the Communist Control bill 
was aimed at the problem of Communist domination of labor unions.90 
The means adopted were the broadening and strengthening of the 
Internal Security Act through the addition of new provisions covering 
"Communist-infiltrated organizations." The bill was soon amended, 
however, to provide that criminal sanctions should attach to member-
ship in the Communist Party when coupled with the commission of 
any acts designed to effectuate the purposes of that party.91 The House 
of Representatives, which had approved the provisions relating to Com-
munist infiltration of labor unions, questioned the wisdom and the 
constitutionality of the Senate addition.92 As the bill finally came from 
88 See editorials in the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, and the 
Wall Street Journal, August 19, 1954. 
89 On the question whether the act made Communist Party membership a "crime," 
for example, compare statements at 100 CoNG. REc. 14333 (August 19, 1954) with those 
at 100 CoNG. REc. 14391 (August 19, 1954). 
90The original bill, S. 3706, was reported in 100 CoNG. REc. 9217 (July 6, 1954). 
91 This amendment, sponsored by Senator Humphrey of Minnesota, was passed unani-
mously [100 CoNG. REc. 13583 (August 12, 1954)]. The criminal penalties were to be 
those imposed by the Internal Security Act, but were apparently to be applied directly 
without the necessity of showing non-compliance with that act. 
92 Many Congressmen, on the other hand, strongly favored the Senate amendments. 
The principal objection raised in the House was that were Communist Party membership 
made a crime the registration provisions of the Internal Security Act would be held invalid 
as compelling self-incrimination in violation of the 5th Amendment to the Constitution. 
Instructive in this connection is the recent decision of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive 
Activities Control Board. 23 U.S. LAw WEEK 2296 (December 23, 1954). 
The Communist Party there sought review of the Board's order that it must register 
as a "Communist-action organization" under the Internal Security Act. One objection made 
by the party was that the act itself violated the 5th Amendment to the Constitution since 
it compelled the furnishing of information which might expose party members to prosecu-
tion under the Smith Act. A majority of the court rejected this argument. The principal 
grounds for decision on the point were the following: (1) the 5th Amendment privilege 
is personal and does not extend to the membership records of an organization; (2) the 
statute is not a violation of any criminal statute; (3) as to offenses involving more than 
mere membership, there is no assurance that the 5th Amendment privilege would or could 
be asserted in some future proceeding, and successful assertion of the privilege would at 
most render the act unenforceable in a given case. 
Judge Bazelon based his dissent from the opinion of the majority on his conclusion 
that the registration provisions of the act could not be reconciled with the 5th Amendment 
prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination. 
It will be noted that much of the majority's reasoning could be used to support the 
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conference, the controversial Senate amendment had been replaced by 
provisions which, in their final form, do two things: (1) they strip the 
Communist Party of all legal rights and privileges under the laws of 
the United States or any political subdivision; (2) they make subject 
to the provisions of the Internal Security Act any member of the Com-
munist Party or other organization having as an objective the violent 
overthrow of the United States Government, or that of any state.93 
These provisions are preceded by a section in which are stated congres-
sional findings with respect to the conspiratorial and authoritarian 
nature of the Communist Party, the policies of which are declared to 
be secretly prescribed by the foreign leaders of world Communism. 
The conclusion is that "the Communist Party should be outlawed." 
It is clear that this most recent federal legislation will be a signifi-
cant factor in future determinations of the validity of state anti-sub-
versive legislation. How significant a factor it will be is difficult to 
say, but a number of observations can be made. First, the Communist 
Control Act does not lay the basis for a finding of outright conflict 
between federal law and state anti-sedition statutes of the type enacted 
by Pennsylvania and by other states. Stated another way, there is no 
inconsistency between federal and state laws such that compliance with 
one would involve violation of the other. In this respect the new law 
does not differ from prior federal legislation in the field. Second, it is 
believed that neither the text of the new law nor the reports and debates 
which comprise its legislative history contain any clear statement of 
congressional intent to preclude the states from passing laws against 
sedition, nor do they indicate that Congress wished the states to be free 
so to legislate. On the latter point it can at least be argued that had 
Congress been seriously disturbed by the holding of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in the Nelson case, it could very easily have eliminated 
the force of that decision.94 In fact it was one of the avowed purposes 
of the Communist Control Act to strengthen the Smith Act, which, as 
will be remembered, underlay the Pennsylvania court's decision. Third, 
Congress has by its detailed declaration and findings of fact bearing 
on the nature of the Communist Party reinforced the argument that 
internal subversion is a problem of paramount national concern, and 
that accordingly there arises what may be called a presumption of 
registration provisions of the Internal Security Act even assuming that Congress were to 
make Communist Party membership criminal per se. 
93 Sections 3 and 4 of P.L. No. 637, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (August 24, 1954). 
94 There is some evidence that Congress, at least in 1950, did not believe that the 
Smith Act had pre-empted the field. See H.R. Rep. No. 2980, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 2 
(1950); H.R. Rep. No. 1950, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 25-46 (1950). 
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federal supersedure. An argument based on similar congressional find-
ings made in the Internal Security Act won approval from the dissent-
ing judge in Albertson v. Millard.95 Fourth, if the controlling test is 
to be occupation of the field, the Communist Control Act represents 
an extension of federal law further into the area of anti-subversive 
legislation, and affords that much more basis for concluding that Con-
gress has enacted a comprehensive scheme _of regulation which must 
be taken to exclude regulation by the states. In both the Smith Act 
and the Communist Control Act Congress expressly recognized and dealt 
with attempts to bring about the violent overthrow not only of the United 
States Government but also of the states and other political subdivi-
sions. It-is surely a tenable conclusion that Congress has laid a firm 
hand upon these matters. Finally, this latest law makes possible the 
contention that in rejecting the imposition of direct criminal sanctions 
upon membership in the Communist Party or other groups having 
similar purposes, Congress indicated that it wished such persons to be 
subject to the general provisions of the Internal Security Act and by 
implication did not wish to expose them to prosecution un~er state 
criminal laws.96 One answer to this is that Congress decided against 
these automatic criminal penalties largely on the suggestion that if they 
were to be imposed much of the Internal Security Act would thereby 
be rendered unconstitutional. Punishment under state criminal stat-
utes would not raise this issue. 97 
The Pennsylvania anti-sedition law shortly to be tested in the 
Supreme Court is only one of a variety of state statutes directed at the 
problem of subversion. 98 The bulk of these laws are not susceptible to 
the objection that they encroach upon areas in which the federal gov-
ernment's interest is supreme. For example, laws prescribing qualifi-
cations for teaching, for public employment and incidental benefits, 
and for public office are well within the sphere of legitimate state inter-
est. 99 It is equally clear, on the other hand, that states may not, con-
95 See note 22 supra. 
96 This approach was also consciously rejected by Congress when it chose the regis-
tration procedures of the Internal Security Act: See H.R. Rep. No. 2980, 81st Cong., 
2d sess. 5 (1950). 
97 Constitutional prohibitions against compulsory self-incrimination restrain only the 
government, federal or state, which demands disclosure. United States v. Murdock, 284 
U.S. 141, 52 S.Ct. 63 (1931). 
98 Reference has already been made to the collection of such laws in GELLHORN, THB 
· STATES AND SUBVERSION (1952), and to the note in 66 HARv. L. REv. 327 (1952). To 
the state statutes must be added municipal ordinances which seek to accomplish similar 
ends. For a listing, see Sutherland, "Freedom and Internal Security," 64 HARv. L. REv. 
383 at 388 (1951). 
99 State laws which deny the use of election facilities to the Communist Party and 
other subversive groups would now seem to be in the clearest accord with congressional 
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sistently with the Constitution, act to bar the immigration or naturaliza-
tion of subversive aliens, withhold passports from members of 
Communist organizations, or deny the use of the mails to subversive 
groups, since such legislation would intrude upon a domain which is 
not only exclusively federal as an initial proposition but one in which 
Congress has acted as well.1°0 The types of state law which raise the 
most serious questions of federal pre-emption, in addition to general 
laws directed against sedition, are statutes which require the registra-
tion of subversive groups, and laws which prohibit membership in the 
Communist Party. 
State registration statutes can be questioned more properly under 
the Internal Security Act than under the Smith Act, since it is with the 
registration provisions of the former that the state statutes are largely 
coincident. The Communist Control Act may be considered as a re-
affirmation of congressional faith in the registration procedures created 
under the 1950 act, but sheds little more light on the question whether 
Congress intended its procedures to be exclusive. The decision of the 
federal district court in Albertson v. Millard provides an excellent 
summary of the arguments which can be urged against and on behalf 
of state registration requirements. Should an eventual Supreme Court 
decision turn upon legislative history, the evidence assembled by Judge 
Simons in that case seems to support his conclusion that Congress did 
not wish to preclude the states from compelling the registration of 
subversive groups.101 In the absence of a more convincing showing of 
legislative intent than has thus far been assembled, however, it seems 
probable that a decision would not be placed on this ground alone. 
Laws which make Communist Party membership illegal per se 
involve a more direct conflict with federal statutes and congressional 
policies than do laws requiring registration. Section 4(£) of the In-
ternal Security Act provides: "Neither the holding of office nor mem-
policy. In fact, to permit such groups to appear on the ballot would now violate that 
section of the Communist Control Act which declares that these organizations are not 
entitled to any rights, privileges or immunities heretofore granted by the United States or 
political subdivisions. The question would rather seem to be whether Congress has not 
intruded into areas of exclusive state concern. For a discussion of these matters prior to 
this recent legislation see 25 NoTRB DAME LAWYER 319 (1950). 
100 The federal statutes involved are, respectively, the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952, 66 Stat. L. 166 (1952), 8 U.S.C. (1952) §1101 et seq. and the Internal 
Security Act, 64 Stat. L. 993 and 996 (1950), 50 U.S.C. (1952) §§785 and 789. It 
should also be apparent that states cannot seek to regulate Communist influence in labor 
unions where the unions are within the sphere of federal power. 
101 A summary of the legislative history of the Internal Security Act is furnished in 
EMERSON AND HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS m THB UNITBD STAT.BS 595-596 
(1952). Judge Simons pointed particularly to the fact that in the House Committee Debates 
when an amendment was offered extending the bill to any government in the United States 
it was ruled not germane since the bill dealt only with the federal government. 
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bership in any Communist organization by any person shall constitute 
per sea violation of ... this section or of any other criminal stdtute."102 
The meaning of this final phrase is not clear. If it may be taken to 
include state statutes, then a direct conB.ict between federal and state 
law is unmistakable. If it is taken to refer only to federal statutes, 
there is a question of contravention of congressional policy that Com-
munist Party membership per se is not to constitute a crime.103 The 
effect of the Communist Control Act in this regard is uncertain. There 
are members of Congress who believe that Congress has itself declared 
Communist Party membership to be a crime.104 The better interpreta-
tion of the act is believed to be that Congress meant to subject members 
of the Communist Party and other like groups to the registration pro-
cedure of the Internal Security Act and to the penalties provided in 
that act for non-registration. This interpretation of the Communist 
Control law is strongly supported in the text itself, and in one part of 
the act Congress specifically provided: "That nothing in this section 
shall be construed as amending the Internal Security Act of 1950, as 
amended."105 
In formulating conclusions as to the probable impact of super-
sedure doctrines on state anti-subversive legislation, perhaps the most 
that can be said is that there exists a £.rm though not unassailable basis 
for invalidating many of these state laws. Invalidation may proceed 
not so much on the ground of exclusive federal power or direct conHict 
with federal law as on the ground of obstruction of congressional pur-
pose or invasion of a federally-occupied field. Recent legislation has 
put the federal government further into the business of suppressing 
subversion. It may be, however, that the Supreme Court's relative 
tolerance of state anti-subversive legislation on other constitutional 
grounds will extend to its conclusions as to pre-emption.106 If actual 
legislative intent is to be weighed, moreover, a likely estimate is that 
few members of Congress favor denying the states power to protect 
themselves from the danger of forcible overthrow. 
102 64 Stat. L. 991 (1950), 50 U.S.C. (1952) §783. Emphasis added. 
103 See the discussion of the point in note, 66 HARv. L. REv. 327 at 330-331 (1952). 
104 Congressman Dies of Texas stated, "The legislative intent of this House is that 
membership in the Communist Party constitutes a crime in itself, and can be punished as 
such." 100 CoNG REc. 14333 (August 19, 1954). 
105 Section 3, P.L. No. 637, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (August 24, 1954). This is the 
section which deprives the Communist Party and like organizations of all rights and privi-
leges under the laws of the United States or political subdivisions. 
106 See Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 72 S.Ct. 380 (1952); Garner v. 
Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716, 71 S.Ct. 909 (1951); and Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 
341 U.S. 56, 71 S.Ct. 565 (1951). In these cases the state and municipal regulations 
concerned matters conceded to be within the states' legitimate domain. 
